CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY
Mischief Night 1991
October 30 & 31, 1991
The Official Report
Another sad event in the City of Camden, the result of the delusion that perceived grievances and a sense of victimization are more important to the common good of a society than maintaining and when necessary enforcing standards of behavior and a sense of gratitude for the opportunity which this country gives and an obligation to serve one's community in time of peace or war, without thought of "what's in it for me". Perhaps the only bright spot of note in this event was the exemplary conduct of the City of Camden's Fire Department and its police officers on the street. To quote now-retired Dennis Dowhy, a Captain with the Camden Fire Department back in October of 1981: "There is a sense of pride that comes with this job, and no one can can rip it apart. A lot of us were born here in Camden. We think protecting the people is worthwhile." |
![]() Open letter to all personnel involved with the CFD on Mischief Night 1991 In
preparation for Mischief Night '91 incidents, my staff and I developed an
operational plan in meetings with the Police Administration. In doing so,
we Jcarnedthatthe Police Department entitled their operational plan
"Operation Pride" for the period or October 30th, 1991. In
terms of fire service planning, some of our staff at Fire Administration
commented on the Police's optimism and more candidly termed last year's
activities as "Operation Urban Storm." In reflecting on what we
in the Fire Department were preparing, based upon our 1990 experience, I
indeed felt that operation pride was less than appropriate. However, after
witnessing firsthand the extraordinary performance of tile Camden Fire
Department, Camden County, Burlington County, Gloucester County, and
Philadelphia Fire Departments during the Mischief Night and Halloween, I
feel what all Fire Fighters achieved was indeed operation pride of the
highest order. In
over 25 years of service to this Department, I have never been more
gratified or so proud. Based on last year's operations in 1990, what we
prepared for was a relatively similar experience. What occurred during
Mischief Night '91 was the single busiest tour of duty in the 122 year
history of the Camden Fire Department. Only the urban riots of the 1970's
saw more overall fire activity over a period of several days but not in
the short span of time that we incurred on the evening or October 30,
1991. Some 150+ alarms were serviced within a very brief period. What our
Fire Control Force accomplished during that short time may never be
surpassed. Our
entire organization functioned like a fine-tuned machine from the top to
the bottom, and may I say that it did not go unnoticed by the majority or
other City Officials. From the administrative planning and preparation for
the incident, to the magnificent execution by our units on the street, the
Department performed nearly flawless. Since
the nights of the extraordinary activity, my staff and I have met in an
attempt to assess what worked well and in what areas improvement may be
needed. There are several areas that we will administratively target in
preparation for future operations. After meeting with the Chiefs, Company
Officers and Fire Fighters who worked both nights I directed that a
comprehensive report be developed. Your
effort on the nights of 30/31 October, 1991 are well noted by this Fire
Administration and they underscore what can be accomplished in a marriage
of organization, planning, and cooperation. Once again my personal
congratulations go out to each and every one of you for the dedication and
remarkable performance that you have shown. The professionalism of your
efforts has once again distinguished the Camden Fire Department as New
Jersey's foremost fire service. ![]()
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MISCHIEF NIGHT COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY
REPORT By
the direction of the by All inquiries can be made
through |
MAYOR OF CAMDEN CITY COUNCIL William
Murray, Risk Manager
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FIRE FIGHTING FORCE
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CAMDEN FIRE DEPARTMENT INTRODUCTION This report is
divided into four sections. This section is an overview and includes
the planning and implementation of Incident Command Operations. The
second section graphically displays past trends of the Camden Fire
Department (CFD) focusing upon mischief night. Included is a detailed
analysis of each region (ZONE) of the City and the fire alarms that
occurred on mischief night in that section. A look at Halloween is
also evaluated and displayed. This section includes known drug
distribution corners in which reported shooting incidents occurred.
This section is critical for anticipating and planning for "Fire
Storm 92". The third section
is a report of the problems encountered during operations and the
needs of the Department to properly prepare for "Fire Storm
92". The last section
is a reference section of the alarms that occurred during this time
period. Differences in the
number of alarms is based on the time frame being analyzed. Mischief
Night, for most of this report, is considered between 1800 hours
October 30, to 0800 hours on Halloween morning, October 31. Halloween
is analyzed from 0800 hours, October 31 to midnight 2400 hours. Some
sections and charts include a 24 hour daily clock 0001-2400 for
comparing past trends and anticipating 1992s mischief night problems. Numerous
departmental reports were prepared and analyzed to develop this
report. This Mischief Night,
October 30, 1991, the City of Camden made international news on CNN.
Top news was the burning of the city. The Fire Department anticipated
a night similar to the year before with a slight increase in alarms.
What occurred was a 96% increase in alarms STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES A typical response
pattern to a structure fire consists on two engine companies, one
ladder company, one rescue company and a battalion chief. Each
addition alarm receives the same complement except for the rescue. A
target hazard assignment receives an additional engine, ladder, and
battalion chief. During reported structural fires at night, an
additional engine is assigned. On Mischief Night
this response remained the same except the extra night time engine
company would not be assigned. The rescue would respond if
special-called by the chief, if "people trapped" were
reported, or if the alarm was a target hazard. The CFD has 8
Engines Companies, 3 Ladder Companies, 3 Battalion Chiefs and 1 Rescue
Company. This complement of equipment can handle three i-Alarm dwelling
fires and two minor fires at one time. The CFD has five reserve
apparatus that could be placed in service by augmenting overtime
personnel. Any additional manpower and equipment is supplied by
mutual-aid companies within the County. In anticipating
similar levels of activity to that which occurred during Mischief Night
1990, the CFD placed 3 reserve engine companies, 1 reserve ladder
company, 1 manpower squad company, and a battalion chief in service
staffed with overtime personnel. Mutual aid companies
were placed on alert. The complete 100 series mutual aid roster was
activated. For each CFD company there is an assigned mutual-aid company
to cover when that CFD unit is committed to service. Two staging areas
were assigned; one was near the Collingswood Fire Station, and the other
at Delaware Gardens Fire Station. In these staging areas there were a
total of 8 engine companies, 3 ladder companies and a rescue company,
comprising the 100 Series Mutual-Aid Units. A major problem
facing the CFD, was the fact that there were between 12 and 15 structurefires
occurring at the same time in different locations within the City.
Around midnight, there were 12 separate fires occurring with reports
still coming in of additional structure fires. By midnight, the previous
fifth and second alarm fires were still not under control. Water
pressure was low so the Water Tanker Task Force was activated. On Mischief Night
1991, the 100, 200, 300, 400, and 500 Series. Units were activated. In
addition, four CFD Battalion Chiefs, a Water Tanker Task Force
(4-tankers), a Heavy Hose Task Force (6-companies), and two Philadelphia
Fire Department (PFD) Task Forces (6Engines, 2-Ladders, and
2-Battalion Chiefs) were activated and responded. Mutual Aid services
from the County of Camden, Burlington, Gloucester and Philadelphia
extensively augmented the CFD fire control force in extinguishing the
numerous fires that occurred, and provided coverage for maintaining
continuity in fire protection. To handle the 133
alarms, the Camden County Communications Center assigned 204 Engine
Companies, 65 Ladder Companies, 62 Battalion Chiefs, 7 Rescue Companies,
and 6 Squad Companies. Each CFD Engine and
Truck Company averaged about 7 laborious hours of intensive fire
fighting throughout the night. |
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ISSUES
TO RESOLVE APPARATUS Need for a utility truck with 125 gallon fuel tank to supply apparatus in the field and also serve as a mobile repair unit. Continue to keep equipment in top shape. Minimize potential apparatus breakdowns .. ACCESS CONTROL Develop an aggressive program to board, brick, block, or remove vacant properties targeting known problem areas. Develop an aggressive program to remove abandon vehicles targeting known problem areas. Request city to issue ordinance, laws, etc. for a 7:00 PM or 8:00 PM curfew on both Mischief Night and Halloween. COMMAND POST Utilize the Fire Administration Building as the Command Post during future operations where other agencies including Police would attend. Location of Command Post Determination of Staff for Command Post COMMUNICATIONS Meet with the Police Department to discuss better communication techniques with Command Post, police and helicopter units. Potential of Citizen Band Radio Communication in coordination with Fire Prevention efforts for Fire Storm 92 Meet with Camden County Communications and Camden County Mutual Aid Coordinator in June 1992. Issues to resolve: Task Force Concepts Water Tanker Task Force Communication Techniques Liaison Personnel Between City and County Direct Line to Call Takers Minimizing Duplicate Calls between Agencies and County Communication Additional portable radios needed for Fire Storm 92. Installation of multiple telephone line receptacles in conference room for future Command Post Operations. Installation of direct phone line between Fire Communications Call Takers and the Fire Administration building conference room for Command Post Operations. EQUIPMENT Audio reel-to-reel recorders. Tear Gas masks for fire personnel. Covers over cab area for fire fighter safety. Prepare adaptor and hydrant kits for use by other companies and the water supply officer during future operations. Kits for Philadelphia fire companies. Acquire 10 additional SCBA for future operations for immediate use. Digital clocks on military time. Electrical power strips, and extension cords. Utilization of rental vehicles for Fire Marshals. Use marked vehicles for extra battalion chiefs. Guidelines for care and use of these vehicles. Equip each reserve apparatus with equivalent first-line equipment. FIRE PREVENTION Involve more members of the community for sighting problem areas, and intelligence. Block Captains with water can extinguishers and radio contact. (Police Critique) Develop and institute a fire prevention program in target areas. Program in high schools to address the seriousness of fires and damage to occupied· buildings, fire equipment, and potential of fire spread. Program to commence in September. FUNDS Secure extra funds in the form of aid: State of Emergency Fund? Estimated 1991 costs to be approximately $86,000. Prepare 1992 costs will increase because of needed additional manpower. Plan for added manpower. MANPOWER Full staffing of Rescue Company and the inclusion of a fifth fire fighter on all apparatus that can accommodate them. Nine Battalion Chiefs for future operations. (3 per district) Develop Task force concept. Discuss advantages and limitations. Keep task force together. If Philadelphia is to be used, notify early. Plan out details. Operational Post & Staging request more manpower for Fire Storm 92. Assign pool of mutual aid pilots at out-of-city staging areas for Fire Storm 92. Utilize all platoons during future operations. The Day platoon would be held over to supply additional personnel; the primary overtime platoon would be used for regular overtime staffing; and the 2nd special call platoon would be utilized to place extra units in service. PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER Assign an area for the press. Assign an officer to the position of Public Informational Officer for the course of both nights. Restrict the entry of press into the Command Post. PARKING Use of Transportation of New Jersey Parking lot for additional fire personnel called back to duty. RESOURCES TNJ could be called upon to provide transportation as needed (Pilots) SAFETY Assign a Safety Officer. Continue to strive for a no injury night like in 1991. STAGING Police report the Woodrow Wilson High School area as a poor idea because of the disruption in school affairs. No phone communications, and football practice is in session. Consider alternatives for staging area with phone communications. Use the apparatus shop as a staging area. This area has a direct route to numerous target areas: 10 & Cedar, Cramer Hill, RT. 676 & 30. Use area behind shop on Newton Avenue as the Staging area. Have sufficient mutual-aid pilots in staging area. At least one per task force. Early staging of fuel, air cascade system, and water tankers services. Use of Collingswood Fire Station as an out-of-city staging depot. |
WATER SUPPLY OFFICER
REPORT Purpose: The purpose of utilizing the Tanker Task Force (TTF) is to prevent Water Supply problems mainly to the Cramer Hill and East Camden areas. Utilizing the TTF early represents a concentrated effort directed toward providing a continuous sufficient water supply. Water problems in Cramer Hill can be potentially devastating to the Incident Commander, therefore, it is important that the Tanker Task Force be activated early. Objective: The objective is two-fold. One, increase and maintain the water flow to the existing water distribution system. Two, provide the Incident Commander with a 1,000 GPM minimum supply of water. Background Information: There are two water distribution systems in Camden. One belongs to Camden Water and the other belongs to New Jersey Water Co. These water distribution systems operates on the grid piping system. This system consists of primary feeders of 16-, 20-, or 30-inch pipe. Connected to the primary feeders are a network of secondary feeders of 1 0-, or 12-inch pipe. Connected to the secondary feeders are smaller internal 4-, 6-, or 8-inch pipe called distributors. Most hydrants are connected to these distributors. With the exception of the Cramer Hill area, most distributors within the City are 6- or 8-inches. Cramer Hill has mostly 4-inch pipe on streets other than River Road, State Street and parts of 27th Street. Under ideal conditions, approximately 250 GPM can flow from 4-inch mains, 750 GPM can flow from 6inch mains, 1600 GPM can flow from an 8-inch main, 2,500 GPM can flow from a 1 O-inch main and over 4,600 GPM can flow from a 12-inch main. Many of the distributors are over 100 years old and have tubercular corrosion or rust incrustation reducing the diameter sufficiently to have noticeable reduced water flows. The reduced water flows were apparent on the 5-alarm fire, 10/22/91, at 17th & Admiral Wilson Blvd and during Mischief Night, 10/30/91 in the Cramer Hill area. Hydrants:
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MISCHIEF NIGHT SOLUTIONS: Water Department: The Water Department agreed to have storage tanks full and increase the water pressure within the system to meet the high demand periods which may occur during the night. In addition, the Water Department has a staff of personnel available to assist the fire department in maintaining an adequate water supply. Fire Department: The first objective, increase and maintain the water flow to the existing water distribution system, should be adequate for most of the city by the above Water Department actions. However, an in-line booster pumping system should be in place when a "Working Fire" has been established in the Cramer Hill area. A pumping link between the 30 inch main on 18th Street and the 12 inch main located at River Road should supplement the grid system with both increase pressure and addition water flow in the direction of water flow usage. This link was established last year (1991) creating a 25 psig increase in water pressure and a noticeable increase in water flow on the fire grounds (approximately 1/2 mile away). At any "Working Fire" in Cramer Hill, or in East Camden, the Water Supply Officer and an 1,500 GPM Engine Company should be dispatched to 18th & River Road. Such proactive action will "booster" the pressure in the system, provide an increase in water flow, maintain existing pressure in the surrounding areas, and provide a tanker shuttle filling location when the TTF is activated. The second objective, provide the Incident Commander with a 1,000 GPM minimum supply of water, can be accomplished by activating the TTF early when water problems arise. The TTF should be automatically activated on a second alarm or greater in the Cramer Hill area. The TTF should be activated early because of "lead-time" required in set-up. Resources:
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